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Abstract
In this work, we propose ENSEI, a secure inference (SI)
framework based on the frequency-domain secure convolu-
tion (FDSC) protocol for the efficient execution of privacy-
preserving visual recognition. Our observation is that, un-
der the combination of homomorphic encryption and se-
cret sharing, homomorphic convolution can be obliviously
carried out in the frequency domain, significantly simplify-
ing the related computations. We provide protocol designs
and parameter derivations for number-theoretic transform
(NTT) based FDSC. In the experiment, we thoroughly
study the accuracy-efficiency trade-offs between time- and
frequency-domain homomorphic convolution. With ENSEI,
compared to the best known works, we achieve 5–11x on-
line time reduction, up to 33x setup time reduction, and up
to 10x reduction in the overall inference time. A further
33% of bandwidth reductions can be obtained on binary
neural networks with only 1% of accuracy degradation on
the CIFAR-10 dataset.
1. Introduction
The design and implementation of privacy-preserving
image recognition based on deep neural network (more
generally, secure machine learning as a service (MLaaS))
attract increasing attentions [4, 11, 19, 21–23, 25, 26]. In
the field of vision-based MLaaS, proprietary model steal-
ing [18, 30] and privacy violation [27] have become one of
the main limitations for the real-world deployment of ML
algorithms. For example, serious privacy concerns have
been raised against medical imaging [12], image-based lo-
calization [29], and video surveillance [5, 31], as leaking
visual representations in such applications can profoundly
undermine the well-beings of individuals. The threat model
in a secure inference (SI) scheme for visual recognition can
be informally formulated as follows. Suppose that Alice as
a client wishes to inference on some of her input images
using pre-trained inference engines (e.g., deep neural net-
works) from Bob. As the image contains her sensitive in-
formation (e.g., organ segmentation), Alice does not want
to reveal her inputs to Bob. On the other hand, it is also
financially unwise for Bob who owns the engine to trans-
fer the pre-trained knowledge base to an untrusted or even
malicious client. A privacy-preserving visual recognition
scheme attempts to address the privacy and model security
risks simultaneously via advanced cryptographic construc-
tions, such as homomorphic encryption [2, 10] and garbled
circuits [32].
Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the topic, SI on
neural networks (NN) involves contributions from many
distinct fields of study. Initial design explorations mainly
focused on the feasibility of NN-based SI, and generally
carry impractical performance overheads [11, 23]. Recent
advances in cryptographic primitives [14] and adversary
models [19, 21] have brought input-hiding SI into practi-
cal domain, where 32× 32 image datasets can be classified
within seconds [19, 25]. Meanwhile, from a learning per-
spective, alternative feature representations are discussed to
reduce the computational complexity of SI [4]. We also ob-
serve that hardware-friendly network architectures [8,9] can
be adopted in a secure setting to reduce the computational
and communicational overheads [25]. Furthermore, design
optimizations on the fundamental operations (e.g., secure
matrix multiplication [17], secure convolution [19]) in SI
can also greatly improve its practical efficiency.
In this work, we propose ENSEI, a general protocol de-
signed for efficient secure inference over images by adopt-
ing homomorphic frequency-domain convolution (FDC). It
is demonstrated that frequency-domain convolution, which
is a key component in reducing the computational complex-
ity of convolutional neural networks, can also be performed
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obliviously, i.e., without the participating parties revealing
any piece of their confidential information. In addition,
we observe that by using the ENSEI protocol, the com-
plex cryptographic procedure of homomorphic multiply-
accumulate (MAC) operation can also be simplified to ef-
ficient element-wise integer multiplications. Our main con-
tributions are summarized as follows.
• Frequency-Domain Secure Inference: To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to adopt FDC in con-
volutional neural network (CNN) based secure infer-
ence. The proposed protocol works for any additive
homomorphic encryption scheme, including pure gar-
bled circuit (GC) based inference schemes [25].
• NTT-based Homomorphic Convolution with Ho-
momorphic Secret Sharing (HSS): The key obser-
vation is that FDC can be carried out obliviously.
Namely, since the discrete Fourier transform opera-
tor is linear, it can be overlaid with HSS to achieve
a weight-hiding frequency-domain secure convolution
(FDSC). In the experiment, we compare ENSEI-based
secure inference with the most recent arts [19, 25].
For convolution benchmarks, we observe 5–11x online
and 34x setup time reductions. For whole-network in-
ference time, we observe up to 10x reduction, where
deeper neural networks enjoy more reduction rates.
• Fine-Grained Architectural Design Trade-Off: We
show that when ENSEI is adopted, different neural ar-
chitectures with the same prediction accuracy can vary
significantly in inference time. As we observe a 6x
performance difference between neural networks with
the same prediction accuracy, performance-aware ar-
chitecture design becomes one of the most important
areas of research for efficient SI.
2. Related Works
Secure Inference Based on Interactive Protocols: In
MinioNN [21], GC and additive secret sharing (ASS) are
used to transform CNN into oblivious neural networks that
ensure data privacy during secure inference, where a se-
cure inference on one image from the CIFAR-10 dataset
requires more than 500 seconds. DeepSecure [26] further
optimize GCs in MinioNN used in NN layers. Even with
simple dataset such as MNIST, DeepSecure still requires
more than 10 seconds and 791MB of network bandwidth.
SecureML [23] adopts the multiplication triples technique
to transfer some computations offline, accelerating the on-
line inference time. Nevertheless, SecureML requires the
existence of two non-colluding servers, and the inference
time is yet from practical.
Secure Inference Based on Homomorphic Encryp-
tions: Instead of only using HE to generate multiplication
triples, CryptoNets [11] and Faster CryptoNets [7] explores
the use of leveled HE (LHE) in secure inference. With the
power of LHE, a two-party protocol is devised where in-
teractions between the server and the client are minimized.
However, due to the fact that HE parameters scale with the
number of network layers, one of the most recent work [4]
still requires more than 700 seconds to evaluate a relatively
shallow neural network.
The Hybrid Protocol: By combining the interactive and
homomorphic approaches, Gazelle [19] significantly im-
proved the efficiency of secure inference compared to ex-
isting works. The details on Gazelle are presented later.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Packed Additive Homomorphic Encryption
In this work, we focus exclusively on lattice-based PAHE
schemes. In particular, the BFV [3, 10] cryptosystem is
used as it is widely implemented (e.g., SEAL [6], PAL-
ISADE [24]). Here, we give a short overview on the basic
operations of BFV.
THe BFV scheme is parameterized by three variables
(n, pE, q), where n represents the lattice dimension, and is
the main security parameter. pE is the plaintext modulus
that determines the maximum size of the plaintext, and q is
the ciphertext modulus. Similar to Gazelle [19], we use [u]
to refer to a PAHE ciphertext holding a plaintext vector u,
where u ∈ ZnpE . In lattice-based PAHE schemes, using the
Smart-Vercaueren packing technique [28], a ciphertext [u]
can be constructed from a set of two integer vectors of di-
mension n (these vectors represent the coefficients of some
polynomials). Since the ciphertexts are actually polynomi-
als rather than vectors, for the encryption of a vector u, we
first turn u into a polynomial u ∈ Rq where Rq is some
residual ring. The ciphertext in BFV is then is structured as
a vector of two polynomials [u] = (c0, c1) ∈ R
2
q , where
c0 = −a, c1 = a · t+
q
pE
u+ e0. (1)
Here, a is a uniformly sampled polynomial, and t, e0 are
polynomials whose coefficients are drawn from some dis-
crete Gaussian distributions. To decrypt, one simply com-
putes pE
q
(c0t + c1) and round off the fractions. Note that
the multiplications (the (·) operation) between polynomials
translate to (nega)cyclic convolutions of the integer vectors
representing their coefficients. For example, in Eq. (1), let
a, t ∈ Znq be the coefficients of a and t, then a · t = a ∗ t,
where ∗ is the convolution operator.
Except for Enc and Dec that denote the encryption and
decryption functions, respectively, we define the following
three abstract operations for an AHE scheme. Recall that
[x] refers the encrypted ciphertext of x ∈ ZnpE
• Homomorphic addition (⊞): for x,y ∈ ZnpE ,
Dec([x]⊞ [y]) = x+ y.
HEConv ReLU ...
Bob (Client)
GC
HEFC
Alice (Server)u sA
sB
...
1 23
... “Person”
Figure 1. The general architecture of the Gazelle inference engine.
The FC layer, much like the Conv layers, is internally a homomor-
phic matrix-vector product.
• Homomorphic Hadamard product (): for x,y ∈
Z
n
pE
,Dec([x]y) = x◦y, where ◦ is the element-wise
multiplication operator.
• Homomorphic rotation (rot): for x ∈ ZnpE ,
let x = (x0, x1, · · · , xn−1), rot([x], k) =
(xk, xk+1, · · · , xn−1, x0, · · · , xk−1) for k ∈
{0, · · · , n− 1}.
We refer to the efficient implementation of  by PAHE
schemes as SIMDScMult. We note that both⊞ and (when
SIMDScMult is available) are cheap operations, while rot
and the homomorphic convolution operation described in
Section 3.3 are much more expensive.
3.2. Secure Neural Network Inference
The main procedures of Gazelle [19] can be summarized
using the example network architecture shown in Fig. 1. As
shown in the figure, the protocol consists of three types
of layers: ➀ the convolution layer Conv, ➁ the fully-
connected layer FC, and ➂ the non-linear layers such as
ReLU and image pooling. Assuming the input image U is
of dimension no×ni, Alice flattensU as a vectoru0 ∈ Z
nu
p ,
where nu = no · ni (i.e., U is raster scanned into u). The
protocol starts with Alice who encryptsu using some PAHE
scheme and sends [u] to Bob. Upon receiving the ciphertext,
Bob performs the corresponding computations depending
on the layer type.
➀ For Conv layers, Bob homomorphically convolves [u]
with a plaintext weight filter W ∈ Zfh×fwp . The convolved
result, [y] = [W ∗u], is randomized by a share of secret sB
as
HomShare([y]) = ([sA], sB) = ([y − sB mod pA], sB)
(2)
with some prime modulus pA. [sA] is returned to Alice, and
Bob keeps sB .
➁ For FC layers, Bob computes some matrix-vector prod-
uct [y] = [W ·u] for a plaintext weight matrixW ∈ Zno×ni ,
and randomizes the result similarly to the Conv layers.
➂ For non-linear layers, Gazelle evaluates the inputs in
three steps:
1) obliviously compute y = sA + sB to de-randomize y
computed in linear layers using Bob’s input sB with GC or
multiplication triplets,
2) compute the non-linear function f (e.g., ReLU or square
from [21]) on y, and
3) re-randomize the result f(y) using another share of se-
cret, sB,1 from Bob, and output sA,1 = f(y) − sB,1 mod
pA for Alice, and sB,1 for Bob.
Upon receiving the outputs fromGC, Alice encrypts sA,1 as
[sA,1], and send the ciphertext to Bob. Bob then computes
[f(y)] = HomRec([sA], sB) = [sA + sB mod pA] (3)
using [sA,1] and sB,1, and obtains [f(y)]. Bob can then start
a new round of linear evaluation (steps➀ and➁), until all
layers are evaluated.
3.3. Homomorphic Convolution
One of the main computational bottlenecks in a typical
CNN architecture [15, 16, 20] is the evaluations of the large
number of Conv layers. While Conv only involves the sim-
ple calculation of a series of inner products, the homomor-
phic version of inner product is complex to compute. For
example, in BFV, for some ciphertext vector [u] and plain-
text vector w, an inner product [v] = [w · u] is computed
as
[v] = w  [u], and [y] =
lg (n)∑
i=1
rot
(
[v],
n
2i
)
. (4)
where expensive homomorphic rotations are required to ac-
cumulate the multiplication results. As it turns out, the
rot operation is expensive in terms of both computational
time and communicational bandwidth. Therefore, one of
the main objectives of ENSEI is to eliminate this complex
homomorphic rotate-and-accumulate process.
4. Oblivious Homomorphic Convolution in the
Frequency Domain
If homomorphic convolution is expensive, a natural
question to ask is that if we can avoid this operation in the
first place. The convolution theorem tells us that for two
discrete sequencesw and u, there exists a general transfor-
mation DFT in the form
DFT(x)k =
nf−1∑
i=0
xi · ω
ik, (5)
where the following property holds
DFT(w ∗ u) = DFT(w) ◦ DFT(u). (6)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the length of the
signals to be convolved is nf , which is basically the filter
dimension in secure inference (i.e., nf = fh · fw). Here,
ω is the n-th root of unity in some field F (i.e., ωn = 1
over F). As shown in [1], if we choose finite fields as F, we
obtain the number theoretic transform (NTT), and Eq. (6)
still holds. For unencrypted convolution (e.g., frequency-
domain convolution algorithms adopted in CNN libraries),
the NTT-based approach is not particularly attractive in
terms of its performance, due to the additional reductions
modulo some large field prime.
We observe a major difference in the encrypted domain.
The main benefit for adopting NTT as the DFT operator
in secure inference is that, in a cryptographic setting, fi-
nite fields are more natural to use than the complex num-
ber field. Most cryptographic primitives that build on es-
tablished hardness assumptions live in finite fields, where
arithmetic operations do not handle real numbers (and com-
plex numbers) particularly well. Therefore, in this work, we
use NTT as our main transformation realization.
4.1. ENSEI: The General Protocol
Before delving into the actual protocol, we provide a
brief summary of the notations used in this section to im-
prove the readability of the derivations.
• u, w: vectors denoting the plaintext input image and
weights, respectively. When vectors are transformed
into the frequency domain, we add a hat, e.g., uˆ.
• sA,0, sB,0: vectors referring to the secret shared vec-
tors for Alice and Bob, respectively, in the zeroth
round of communication.
• no, ni, fh, fw: the image and filter dimensions.
• n, pE, q: the RLWE parameters shown in Section 3.1.
• pN, pA: the NTT and the secret sharing moduli, re-
spectively.
Figure 2 details the general protocol for an oblivious ho-
momorphic convolution in the frequency domain. In this
protocol, we assume the existence of a pair of general dis-
crete Fourier transform (DFT) operators DFT and IDFT,
and a pair of homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme
HomShare and HomRec (as depicted in Eq. (2) and (3)) for
randomization and derandomization. In what follows, we
provide a detailed explanation on the proposed protocol.
First, we say that Alice holds some two-dimensional
plaintext input image U ∈ Zno×ni . Alice wants to infer-
ence on U with a set of filters {W ∈ Zfh×fw} held by Bob.
The protocol is executed as follows.
1. Line 1–3, Alice: Alice first pads the input according
to the convolution type (e.g., same or valid), and com-
putes a two-dimensional DFT on U as DFT2D(U).
Here, DFT2D is the two-dimensional DFT operator.
Alice flattens the frequency-domain matrix to uˆ and
encrypts it using Enc. The encrypted ciphertext [uˆ] =
Enc(uˆ) is transferred to Bob through public channels.
2. Line 3–4, Bob: Bob also performs similar padding,
DFT, and the flatten operations on the (unencrypted)
weight matrix, obtaining wˆ = flatten(DFT2D(W ))
as the result. Upon receiving [uˆ], Bob carries out the
frequency-domain homomorphic convolution by com-
puting a simple homomorphic Hadamard product be-
tween [uˆ] and transformed plaintext wˆ. In order to pre-
vent weight leakages, Bob applies HomShare from the
HSS protocol and acquires two shares of secrets [sˆA,0]
and sˆB,0 according to Eq. (2). Bob sends the shared
secret [sˆA,0] back to Alice.
3. Line 4–6, Alice: Alice decrypts [sˆA,0] as sˆA,0. Both
Alice and Bob apply IDFT to the shares of secret to
obtain
sA,0 = IDFT(sˆA,0)
= IDFT(uˆ0 ◦ wˆ0 − sˆB,0) mod pA (7)
sB,0 = IDFT(sˆB,0) mod pA, (8)
marking the end of the evaluation for the first convo-
lution layer in the NN. We note that when the IDFT
operator is error free, Eq. (7) evaluates to
IDFT(uˆ0 ◦ wˆ0 − sˆB,0) mod pA
= IDFT(uˆ0 ◦ wˆ0)− IDFT(sˆB,0) mod pA (9)
= u0 ∗w0 − sB,0 mod pA. (10)
4. Line 7–8, Alice and Bob: In implementing oblivoius
activation, the essential computations involved in GC
(or multiplication triples) can be formulated as
u0 ∗w0 = sA,0 + sB,0 mod pA (11)
u1 = f(u0 ∗w0) (12)
sA,1 = u1 − sB,1 mod pA, (13)
where f is some activation function (e.g., ReLU). As
mentioned, the above procedure only remains correct
if the underlyingDFT operator satisfies Eq. (9).
5. Line 9–10, Alice: Upon receiving the computed re-
sults from oblivious activation, Alice repeats the pro-
cess of Line 1–3. The transformed and encrypted in-
puts [sˆA,1] are again sent to Bob.
6. Line 11–13, Bob: The final step to complete the
proposed protocol is the HomRec procedure as in
Eq. (3). Since [sˆA,1] = [DFT(u1 − sB,1)] and sˆB,1 =
DFT(sB,1), when the same condition in Eq. (9) holds,
Alice Bob
1. uˆ0 = DFT2D(U)
2. [uˆ0] = Enc(uˆ0,K)
3.
[uˆ0]
−−−−−→ [uˆ0 ◦ wˆ0] = [uˆ0]  wˆ0
4. [sˆA,0] , sˆB,0 = HomShare([uˆ0 ◦ wˆ0])
5. sˆA,0 = Dec([sˆA,0])
[sˆA,0],
←−−−−−−
6. sA,0 = IDFT2D(sˆA,0) sB,0 = IDFT2D(sˆB,0)
7.
sA,0
−−−−−→ Activation
sB,0
←−−−−−
8.
sA,1
←−−−−− Function
sB,1
−−−−−→
9. sˆA,1 = DFT2D(sA,1) sˆB,1 = DFT2D(sB,1)
10. [sˆA,1] = Enc(sˆA,1,K)
11.
[sˆA,1]
−−−−−−→ [uˆ1] = HomRec([sˆA,1] , sˆB,1)
12. [uˆ1 ◦ wˆ1] = [uˆ1]  wˆ1
13. [sˆA,2] , sˆB,2 = HomShare([uˆ1 ◦ wˆ1])
14. sˆA,2 = Dec([sˆA,2])
[sˆA,2]
←−−−−−−
...
Figure 2. The start and intermediate rounds of the Gazelle protocol with frequency-domain convolution via DFT.
we have
[DFT(u1 − sB,1)]⊞ DFT(sB,1) (14)
= [uˆ1 − DFT(sB,1) + DFT(sB,1)] = [uˆ1] (15)
and a new round of FDSC can be carried out.
The evaluation of any CNN can be decomposed into the
repetitions of the above procedures, as our protocol is es-
sentially a way of obliviously moving into and out of the
frequency domain.
Note that the DFT operator in Fig. 2 does not have to be
NTT. However, adopting NTT in the protocol requires min-
imal modification, as we only need to replace the DFT and
IDFT operators in Fig. 2 with NTT and INTT. In this case,
in addition to the secret sharing modulus pA and encryption
modulus pE, we need a third modulus pN for ENSEI-NTT.
In other words, we have ωn ≡ 1 mod pN, and the corre-
sponding transformation is written as
NTT(x)k =
nf−1∑
i=0
xiω
ik mod pN. (16)
4.1.1 Correctness for NTT-based ENSEI
Here, the correctness of the NTT version of our protocol
is briefly explained, and a more detailed discussion can be
found in the appendix. We assert that due to the need of
finite-field arithmetic, not every pair ofDFT operators work
for the above protocol. The most important condition to
ensure correctness is that Eq. (9) equals to Eq. (10), and
that Eq. (14) equals to Eq. (15). If we instantiate ENSEI
with NTT, then, the correctness holds when the following
statement is true
INTT(uˆ ◦ wˆ − sˆB) mod pA (17)
= (INTT(uˆ ◦ wˆ)− INTT(sˆB)) mod pA (18)
= (u ∗w − sB) mod pA. (19)
The convolution result u ∗w can be recovered by applying
the recovery procedure of HSS, under the condition that the
HSS modulus pA is larger than the NTT modulus pN. A
similar procedure also ensures the correctness of Eq. (14)
and Eq. (15).
4.1.2 Security
In terms of security properties, our protocol is basically
identical to the linear kernel in Gazelle [19], so a formal
proof is left out. Briefly speaking, given the security of the
PAHE scheme, Bob cannot temper the encrypted inputs of
Alice (e.g., u), and with HSS, Alice gains no knowledge of
the models from Bob (e.g.,w).
5. Integration and Parameter Instantiation
5.1. Reducing the Number of DFT in ENSEI
The plaintext packing technique [28] used for embed-
ding a vector of plaintext integers u ∈ Znp into a single
/55%*OQVU
0VUQVU
/55
 "EE3-8&
&ODSZQUJPO4UFQ
/55
%FDSZQUJPO4UFQ
$POTUBOUT
4VC3-8&
$POTUBOUT
/55

/55%

/55
)BEBNBSE
1SPEVDU4*.%4D.VMU
Figure 3. The overview for a sequence of Enc-SIMDScMult-Dec
procedures based on ENSEI for general AHE schemes.
/55%*OQVU
3-8&
&ODSZQUJPO4UFQ
4*.%4D.VMU
$POTUBOUT
/55

4VN )BEBNBSE
1SPEVDU
0VUQVU
%FDSZQUJPO4UFQ
4VC3-8&
$POTUBOUT
/55%

/55
Figure 4. Modified Enc-SIMDScMult-Dec for Gazelle-like net-
works to reduce the extra NTTs for plaintext packing.
ciphertext pair relies on the idea that a large-degree poly-
nomials (with proper modulus) can be decomposed into a
set of independent polynomials that are of smaller degrees.
The exact procedures for lattice-based PAHE is sketched in
Fig. 3, where we can see that during encryption, a vector of
plaintext is transformed into the time domain via the INTT
operation and embedded into the ciphertext. Later in the
evaluation stage, SIMDScMult re-applies NTT on the ci-
phertext (and thus simultaneously on the plaintext) followed
by an element-wise multiplication, which also conducts the
coefficient-wise multiplication on the plaintext vector. We
see that while Fig. 3 is a straightforward application of EN-
SEI, it clearly involves redundant NTTs.
Our key observation here is that, the internal opera-
tion of a SIMDScMult is merely conducting frequency-
domain multiplication of polynomials (shown in Fig. 3),
as it is known that a multiplication between two poly-
nomials in some particular quotient rings equates to a
(nega-)cyclic convolution of their coefficients. Therefore,
we can directly embed the NTT2D-transformed frequency-
domain image into the NTT transformed ciphertext (i.e.,
aˆ · sˆ + NTT2D(U)), as depicted in Fig. 4, and execute
SIMDScMult without NTT operations during the encryp-
tion stage (the RLWE constants can be generated offline).
By performing the entire Enc-SIMDScMult process in the
frequency domain, we can reduce two NTT butterflies per
convolution. Note that, because the homomorphic rotations
employed in Gazelle (rot) force several rounds of NTTs for
switching the decryption keys (such that proper keys are
generated to decrypt the rotated ciphertext), ENSEI needs
much less NTT runs compared to the time-domain convo-
lution devised by Gazelle. The only restriction in ENSEI
is that the plaintext modulus pE needs to be larger than the
ENSEI modulus pN. Further elaborations on the exact pre-
cision settings that satisfy the requirement pE ≥ pN is dis-
cussed in the experiment.
5.2. The Moduli and RLWE Parameters
In ENSEI, we have three moduli to consider: the secret
sharing modulus pA, the encryption modulus pE, and the
NTT modulus pN. The three moduli need to satisfy the re-
lation pE ≥ pA ≥ pN. As it turns out, pN is determined by
two factors: i) the maximum value in the matrix operands,
and ii) the length of the convolving sequence. For two se-
quences u ∈ Zno×ni and w ∈ Zfh·fw , the lower bound on
pN can be written as
pN ≥ max(u) ·max(w) · fh · fw. (20)
Suppose nf = fh · fw, in a typical CNN setting, compared
to the RLWE lattice dimension n, nf is generally small
(e.g., nf = 9 for the 3×3 filters used in the experiment). In
addition, in hardware-friendly network architectures, such
as BinaryConnect [8] or BinaryNet [9], max(u) is gener-
ally less than 10-bit, andmax(w) is even smaller.
As described, pE only needs to be as large as pN. This
is not a problem when pN is large. However, when all the
terms in Eq. (20) is small, we can set pN to be extremely
small, but not pE. For security reasons, n needs to be a
relative large power of 2 (e.g., 1024 to 2048), and pE can
only be as small as the smallest prime that completely splits
over the field xn +1 (e.g., for n = 2048, pE ≥ 12289), and
we cannot set pE = pN if pN < 12289. Fortunately in this
case, since pN is not related to the security of PAHE, we can
still use a smaller pN to transform the weight matrix. The
small size of pN makes the coefficients of the transformed
weight matrix small, thereby reducing the noise growth and
the size of the ciphertext modulus.
6. Complexity Analysis and Numerical Exper-
iments
6.1. Complexity Analysis for ENSEI
Given the integrated protocol, we give a comparison be-
tween the asymptotic computational complexity of Gazelle
and ENSEI. We formulate the complexity based on three
basic operations, tpE , tq, and tpN , which are the respec-
tive time of performing a multiplication modulo pE, q, and
pN. As described above, we assume the convolution is per-
formed between the input U of dimension nu = no × ni,
and W of dimension nf = fh × fw. We also use βnu for
⌈nu
n
⌉, the ratio between the input image dimension and lat-
Table 1. Prediction Accuracy on the CIFAR-10 Dataset
Precision Input Filter Accuracy
Bit Width Bit Width
Binary 8 1 81%
Medium 8 4 79%
High 11 7 82%
High-Square 11 7 82%
Full 32 32 83%
[19, 21] - - 82%
Table 2. Proposed Candidate Parameter Sets
Protocol Parameter Binary Medium High
ENSEI-NTT
pN 2311 147457 2359303
⌈lg pN⌉ 11 12 18
pE 12289 147457 2363393
⌈lg pE⌉ 14 18 22
⌈lg q⌉ 45 53 60
tice dimension. For ENSEI-NTT, we have
βnu
(
4 · (n · log(nu) · tpN) + n · tq + 2 · n log(n) · tq
)
,
(21)
which is of order O(nu · log(nu)), since the RLWE pa-
rameter n is a constant. In Eq. (21), the forward NTTs on
U and W , and the backward inverse NTT on the convolu-
tion result and randomization vector counts for four trans-
formations over the field FpN . The last term in Eq. (21)
counts for the encryption and decryption costs, where NTTs
are performed on the ciphertext with lattice dimension n.
Since Gazelle [19] did not provide formal complexity cal-
culations, the analyses here are only of estimations.
βnu
(
2 · n log(n) · tq + (ni · fw − 1) · (no · fh − 1) · n · tq+
n log(n) · tq + n log(n) · tQ
)
, (22)
where tQ is the time for generating the Galois key with
a slightly larger modulus Q, as described in [14]. Two
points are emphasized here. First, it can be seen that the
second term in Eq. (22) depends on both the input image
and filter window, which means that the complexity is of
O(nu · log(nu) · nf ). In contrast, ENSEI-NTT is only of
O(nu · log(nu)). This is the primary reason why Gazelle
does not scale well, as both the time for rotation and the ci-
phertext modulus q = O(Poly(pE)) increase as a result of
larger weight matrices.
6.2. Experiment Setup
In order to quantitatively assess the impact of ENSEI on
secure inference, we implemented the ENSEI protocol us-
ing the SEAL library [6] in C++. We also performed ac-
curacy test to estimate the smallest NTT modulus pN for
different parametrizations of PAHE.
Most existing works [19, 21] only show the main accu-
racy and performance results on either MNIST or CIFAR-
10, or even smaller datasets [25]. For fair comparisons, we
first report accuracy and quantization experiments using the
same architecture in one of the most recent works [19], and
then compare ENSEI-based SI on other architectures (with
different protocols) suggested in [25]. The accuracy results
are obtained using the Tensorflow library [13], and the run-
time of homomorphic convolution is recorded on an Intel
Core i3-7100 CPU 3.90GHz processor.
6.3. CNN Prediction Accuracy
Using the same architecture in [19,21], Table 1 illustrates
how the prediction accuracy improves as the bit precision
increases in SI. We observe that for 11-bit features and 7-bit
weights, the accuracy is on an equivalent level to the full-bit
precision case (the difference is less than 1%). Meanwhile,
the binary-weight instance can reach a final prediction ac-
curacy of 81%, which is only 1% less than the original ac-
curacy reported in [19, 21] (we may have used different hy-
perparameters).
As later observed in Section 6.6, using GC-based ReLU
on the first several convolution layers brings significant per-
formance overhead to both existing works [19, 21] and EN-
SEI. Therefore, we experimented on a different network
architecture, where some of the ReLU layers are replaced
with the square activation (SA) function proposed in [21].
We found that replacing a small amount of ReLU with SA
(denoted as High-Square in Table 1) does not affect the
prediction accuracy much, while replacing all ReLU layers
with SA does (accuracy becomes only 10%). Nonetheless,
even replacing a small portion of ReLU with SA proves to
be critical in improving the practicality of ENSEI-based SI,
as demonstrated in Section 6.6.
6.4. Quantization and Parameter Instantiations
From the previous section, we obtain the maximum val-
ues on u and w. Hence, we can apply Eq. (20) to instan-
tiate three sets of RLWE parameters for adopting the fine-
grained layer-to-layer (and network-to-network) precision
adjustment. We take the high-precision case with a 3 × 3
filter size as an example. For 12-bit u and 6-bitw, pN needs
to satisfy
pN ≥ 2
12 · 26 · 9, (23)
and that pN ≡ 1 mod 3. The lattice dimension n is fixed
to be 2048 to ensure efficient packing and a 128-bit secu-
rity. We find the minimal pE ≥ pN for the pN required
such that pE ≡ 1 mod n. Finally, the ciphertext modulus
q is adjusted accordingly to tolerate the error growth while
retaining the security requirement, with overwhelming de-
cryption success probability (the discrete Gaussian parame-
ter σ is set to 4).
The calculated moduli and instantiated parameters are
shown in Table 2. Using a pN that is much smaller than pE,
Table 3. Computational Cost of ENSEI with Respect to Different Parameter Sets Measured in Microseconds
Precision Image Encryption Filtering Result tonline PAHE Filter tsetup Galois-Key
Read Constants (Hadamard) Decryption Setup Read Generation
ENSEI-NTT Binary 197.4 92.1 146.7 (7.3) 150.6 587.1 21972.2 1l0.6 22082.8 76983.2
ENSEI-NTT High 197.3 92.4 147.5 (7.3) 151.2 588.5 21351.6 110.2 21462.2 77039.3
Table 4. Convolution Benchmarks w.r.t Precision Levels
Input Dim. Filter Dim. Precision tsetup tonline Bandwidth
Gazelle (28 × 28 × 1) (5× 5× 5) - 11.4ms 9.20ms 130KB
Gazelle (32× 32× 32) (3 × 3× 32) - 704ms 195ms -
ENSEI-NTT (28 × 28 × 1) (5× 5× 5) Binary 22.0ms 1.8ms 46.0KB
ENSEI-NTT (28 × 28 × 1) (5× 5× 5) High 21.4ms 1.8ms 61.4KB
ENSEI-NTT (32× 32× 32) (3 × 3× 32) Binary 22.0ms 16.9ms 184KB
ENSEI-NTT (32× 32× 32) (3 × 3× 32) High 21.4ms 16.9ms 246KB
we generate less noises in the ciphertext, and the Binary pa-
rameter set enjoys from a smaller ciphertext modulus. The
resulting ciphertext is 33% smaller than the High parameter
set, as shown in Section 6.5.
6.5. Efficiency Comparison to Gazelle
We summarize the performance data of ENSEI-NTT
with respect to different parameter instantiations in Table 3.
The running times are an average of 10,000 trials measured
in microseconds. Here, tsetup is time consumed by pro-
cedures that do not involve user inputs. Likewise, tonline
refers to the time for input-dependent steps, and is the sum
of all terms in Table 3 up to tonline horizontally. In par-
ticular, the results show that the time it takes to compute
the Hadamard product (shown in parenthesis after the Fil-
ter column) is only a fraction of the time consumed by the
NTT operations (the filtering step contains two NTT butter-
flies), which need to be applied once per each of the input
and filter channels.
Using the instantiated parameters and recorded speed,
the performance comparison of ENSEI-NTT and Gazelle
on a set of convolution benchmarks are summarized in Ta-
ble 4. In Table 4, we see that for larger benchmarks, the
online convolution time is reduced by nearly 11x across all
precisions with ENSEI-NTT. In addition, we point out that
the setup time of ENSEI scales extremely slowly with the
dimensions of the images and filters. Therefore, we observe
a nearly 34x reduction in setup time for the larger bench-
marks. In combined, ENSEI-NTT obtains a 23x reduction
in total time for a 32-channel convolution.
6.6. Architectural Comparisons
Lastly, we compare different architectures with and with-
out FDSC to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ENSEI
protocol. Table 5 summarizes the inference time with re-
spect to increasingly deep neural architectures, and the ac-
curacy is measured on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We first ob-
serve that, while HE-based linear layers represent a large
portion of the computational time (from 40% up to 80%
of the total inference time), the GC-based non-linear ReLU
Table 5. The Impact of Neural Architecture on Inference Time
Architecture #Conv Accuracy ENSEI Prior Arts
Total Time Time
Fig. 13 in [21] 7 82% 7.72 s 12.9 s
High-Square 7 82% 1.38 s -
BC2 in [25] 9 82% 2.76 s 4.8 s
BC3 in [25] 9 86% 14.7 s 35.8 s
BC4 in [25] 11 88% 30.91 s 123.9 s
BC5 in [25] 17 88% 30.98 s 147.7 s
computations become the bottleneck when ENSEI is em-
ployed. By replacing the second and fifth ReLU layer in the
benchmark architecture (the complete architecture can be
found in the appendix), the online SI time can be reduced
to 1.38 seconds, nearly 10x faster than the baseline method.
Using ENSEI, what we discovered is that, under the same
accuracy constraint, certain neural architectures are much
more efficient when implemented using secure protocols.
Hence, efficient ways of finding such architecture becomes
an important future area of research.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed ENSEI, a frequency-domain
convolution technique that accelerates CNN-based secure
inference. By using a generic DFT, we show that oblivious
convolution can be built on any encryption scheme that is
additively homomorphic. In particular, we instantiate and
integrate ENSEI with NTT and compare ENSEI-NTT to
one of the most recent work on secure inference, Gazelle. In
the experiment, we observed up to 23x reduction in convo-
lution time, and up to 10x in the overall inference time. We
demonstrate that PAHE-based protocol is one of the sim-
plest and most practical secure inference scheme.
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